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Resumo
A Reforma do Setor da Segurança: Uma Nova Re-
lação Estado-indivíduo
Os autores procuram identificar aspetos comuns 
às diferentes doutrinas no âmbito da Reforma do 
Setor da Segurança, descrevem de modo genérico 
o caso‑estudo da missão da União Europeia para a 
Reforma do Setor da Segurança na Guiné‑Bissau 
e traçam as linhas de força da política portuguesa 
em matéria de cooperação externa. O texto apre‑
sentado evidencia uma continuidade representada 
pela centralidade das necessidades de segurança 
do indivíduo, como destinatário último deste tipo 
de processos de transformação.
Abstract
The authors attempt to identify the Security Sector Re-
form common doctrinal aspects. They also describe the 
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Mission and the major Portu-
guese instruments of policy related to external coopera-
tion. The essay envisages drawing the reader’s attention 
to the individual security needs, which should be kept as 
the main focus of every SSR processes.
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Do We Have a Security Sector Reform (SSR) Common Doctrine?
“The establishment of effective partnerships will be vital... to SSR processes”.
UN Security Council (2008: IX, 17)
Yes indeed. SSR is a new way of organizing an old idea – a new way to em‑
power the old State. In fact, when Edward Reilly Stettinius in 1945 reported to 
US Government on the San Francisco Conference, he recognized that from that 
moment onwards two new battles would be fought: security, which he meant to 
be understood as freedom from fear, and the battle for common development (US 
Government Printing Office, 1945). Moreover, he emphasized that both battles 
were to be waged successfully and concurrently. This relation between security 
and development is the SSR’s current doctrine cornerstone. Later in 1994, the Hu‑
man Development Report (UN Development Programme, 1994: 22) mentioned 
that “Human security is a universal concern. It is relevant to people everywhere, 
in rich nations and poor. There are many threats that are common to all people‑
such as unemployment, drugs, crime, pollution and human rights violations. Their 
intensity may differ from one part of the world to another, but all these threats to 
human security are real and growing… In defining security, it is important that hu‑
man security not be equated with human development”. In 1999 the UK Secretary 
Chart 1 – SSR Policy Framework Evolution
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of State Clare Short referred to SSR to emphasize the idea of associating develop‑
ment and security in a conflict prevention perspective. Again, in the year 2000 
the documentation produced by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) also acknowledged the strong link between security and de‑
velopment. Furthermore, the United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000) and 
the Brahimi Report openly linked conflict prevention and transition to peace with 
human security and social development (Brahimi, 2000: 6).1
After this initial phase and between 2005 and 2006 the European Union (EU) 
and the OECD drafted a set of documentation establishing the doctrinal basis of 
SSR. Generally, the doctrine acknowledged the relation between security and de‑
velopment focused on the human dimension. In addition, the European Commis‑
sion drafted a document in 2006, called “Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament” in which the following has been 
mentioned: “… Security… it focuses on human security ‑ freedom from want, free‑
dom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf” (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2006: 4)2. Furthermore, analyzing in general terms the 
documentation produced by the UE, OECD, and United Nations we might say that 
the doctrine paid attention to SSR goals, concepts, principles, characteristics and 
actors. Moreover, in 2008 and 2011 the United Nations established two pillars of 
SSR doctrine by releasing two very important documents: the General Assembly 
comprehensive review of the whole issue of peacekeeping operations in all their 
aspects (UN Security Council, 2008) – the role of United Nations in supporting 
security sector reform, and the Statement by the President of the Security Council 
on 12 October 2011 entitled “maintenance of international peace and security”. 
This set of doctrinal comprehensive references is summarized in the following 
roster. Therefore, and despite the fact that doctrine cannot be labeled as “com‑
mon”, we might conclude that the essence of SSR doctrinal references are shared 
among the key international organizations. In addition, and taking into account 
the human dimension of SSR, our vision drifts from moving away from the tra‑
ditional State security to focus exclusively on human security. In fact, SSR pays a 
high level of attention to the human component of State security, moving from a 
closed and traditional approach towards a comprehensive construction of security, 
1 “(…) 34. Summary of key recommendations on preventive action: (a) The Panel endorses the rec‑
ommendations of the Secretary‑General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Mil‑
lennium Report and in his remarks before the Security Council’s second open meeting on conflict 
prevention in July 2000, in particular his appeal to “all who are engaged in conflict prevention 
and development — the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, Governments and Civil 
Society Organizations — [to] address these challenges in a more integrated fashion; (…)”.
2 It quotes from the Human Security Now, the final Report of the Commission on Human Securi‑
ty (2003) and the Commission Communication on Governance and Development, COM(2003).
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Security HR and development are 
interdependent (UN Security Council, 
2008: 3)
Long term process… nationally owned 
(UN Security Council, 2011: 1)
SSR is Peace building and Conflict 
Prevention component (UN Security 
Council, 2011: 2)
Regional frameworks are the 
foundations of bilateral SSR efforts 
(UN Security Council, 2011: 2)
Goal: the enhancement of effective 
and accountable security (UN Security 
Council, 2008: 6)
Accessible and responsive to all 
and broad rule of law framework 
(UN Security Council, 2008: 4 e 
2011: 2) - holistic & coherent (UN 
Security Council, 2008: 2) … beyond 
the traditional military elements 
(UN Security Council, 2008: 6) … it 
includes State and non-State actors 
(UN Security Council, 2008: 6)
Key component of the “human
security” agenda (OECD/
DAC, 2004: 3)
Outsiders frequently 
underestimate the complexity 
and long-term nature of SSR 
(OECD/DAC, 2004: 62)
Explicitly for SSR or integrated 
into policies for related issues 
such as conflict prevention 
(OECD/DAC, 2004: 65)
Adopt a regional perspective 
(OECD/DAC, 2004: 50)
…Reforms should seek to 
address issues relating both 
to the operational capacity of 
security bodies (effectiveness) 
and how they are governed 
(accountability). (OECD/DAC, 
2004: 58)
Holistic and principle-based
Approach (OECD/DAC, 2004: 
61)
Support to SSR in partner countries 
is one of the core areas for EU action 
identified in the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) (Council of the 
European Union, 2005: 4)
Needs to be long-term and be 
based on strong national ownership 
(Commission of the European 
Communities, 2006: 1; Council of the 
European Union 2005: 11)
… In longer-term post conflict
peace building and reconstruction 
processes (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006: 6) 
… SSR can be a useful instrument 
to prevent conflicts (Council of the 
European Union 2005: 8)
Nationally/regionally owned reform 
processes (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006: 7) … 
national ownership and partnership 
(Council of the European Union 
2005: 4)
… Objective is to contribute 
explicitly to the strengthening of 
good governance, democracy, the 
rule of law, the protection of human 
rights and the efficient use of public 
resources (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006: 6).
Holistic process, strengthening 
security for all citizens (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2006: 1; 
Council of the European Union 2005: 
11) … it focuses on human security… 
putting the security of
citizens at the centre and thus 
complementing State security 
(Commission of the European 
Communities, 2006: 4)
United Nations
Organization for 
Economic Cooperation 
and Development
European Union
Table 1 – UN, OECD and EU Perspectives on SSR
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which takes into account, besides the sovereign needs, new desires to accomplish 
the same old goal: to maintain peace and security outside and within the State.
Moreover, United States doctrine moves in the same direction by stating that 
SSR is a relatively new discipline in the context of peace and stability operations, 
whether these operations are United Nations‑led or otherwise managed and sup‑
ported. The same doctrine also acknowledges that there is no single way to con‑
duct SSR. Furthermore, it sees SSR as an attempt to build capacities within the in‑
tricate network of institutional instruments that can positively affect safety and the 
rule of law. The reforms in such context aim to provide an effective and legitimate 
public service that is transparent, accountable to civil authority, and responsive to 
the needs of the public (Meharg, 2010: 1‑3).
Generally speaking, SSR doctrine moves towards a new State‑citizen effective 
partnership, based on mutual needs, implementing a State bilateral tailored‑serv‑
ice provider concept and enforcing a mutual goal of steady development.
Why and What to Reform?
“Security matters”.
Paul D. Williams (2008)
The Security Sector Reform (SSR) is foremost a smart approach to future violent 
conflicts. It is necessary to conduct reform because “development without security 
is not possible”, and “security without development is only temporary” (Benn, 
2004: 4). On the one hand insecurity prevents development and protracts the cycle 
of poverty. On the other hand security leverages development and empowers its 
own instruments by reducing the deep, underlying causes of insecurity. The aim 
of any Security Sector Reform is to identify balanced solutions to protect the State 
monopoly of violence, after due consideration of the shift in the nature of conflicts. 
The key aspect of a successful SSR is to move from a security concept based on the 
“threat between States” to a new approach, complementary to the previous one, 
based on “individual needs for safety”. Kalevi Holsti (1996, p. 15) uses the formula 
security between States and within States which, nowadays, should be placed side‑
by‑side with the formula used by Stephen E. Sachs (2003, p: 5) military tasks and 
nonmilitary tasks, involving State actors and non State actors (DCAF/ISSAT, 2011: 4).
The Security Sector Reform is seen as a long‑term process (UN Security Coun‑
cil, 2011: 1) concerning all the security‑related institutions, which bear the legal 
right of using force. Moreover, it engages State and non‑State actors, united to 
build a security system capable of being effective and accountable. Therefore, it 
ought to reform security and justice sectors in an integrated manner, establish‑
ing a balanced, effective and accountable system. Security and justice sectors are 
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interdependent and mutually supportive. To reform one sector without the other 
might lead to a general failure of the whole SSR process. Consequently, SSR has to 
be conducted in a way that links security and justice State providers, security and 
justice non‑State providers, security and justice State oversight institutions and 
security and justice non‑State oversight bodies in a balanced manner.
Cognizant that no single model of security sector reform should be taken as a 
golden rule to be applied and enforced, the United National General Assembly Re‑
port A/62/659 (UN Security Council, 2008: 6) on the role of United Nations in sup‑
porting SSR, points out five golden features common to every SSR (bold added):
• A legal and/or constitutional framework providing for the legitimate and 
accountable use of force in accordance with universally accepted human 
rights norms and standards, including sanctioning mechanisms for the use 
of force and setting out the roles and responsibilities of different actors;
• An institutionalized system of governance and management: mechanisms 
for the direction and oversight of security provided by authorities and insti‑
tutions, including systems for financial management and review as well as 
the protection of human rights;
• Capacities: structures, personnel, equipment and resources to provide effec‑
tive security;
• Mechanisms for interaction among security actors: establishing transparent 
modalities for coordination and cooperation among different actors, based 
on their respective constitutional/legal roles and responsibilities;
• Culture of service: promoting unity, integrity, discipline, impartiality and 
respect for human rights among security actors and shaping the manner in 
which they carry out their duties.
Chart 2 – SSR Sectors
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SSR is about making the State safe for people to feel secure. When we ques‑
tioned what should be reformed, we certainly meant institutions, processes, prac‑
tices, interactions, governance, effectiveness, capacities, sustainability, participa‑
tion, legal and financial instruments, trust, and confidence. However, without an 
individual attitude of buying‑into a culture of service, in which the common good 
is perceived as the quintessential goal of the State, SSR would hardly flourish. SSR 
is an opportunity to transform an entire State sector to meet the needs and expec‑
tations of national citizens, beginning with the external exercise of sovereignty to 
address also the internal roots of insecurity, in order to pursue human, economic 
and social development. SSR is not about disarmament, demobilization and re‑
integration (DDR), it is not about small arms and light weapons control (SALW 
Control), it is not about the fight against impunity and corruption, it is not about 
transitional justice, it is not about donors and projects, nor is it about the struggle 
against gender‑based violence. These are important cross‑cutting issues that might 
be used as entry points. In fact, SSR concerns the building of a new State system 
capable of providing good governance, division of powers, rule of law, checks and 
balances, human rights’ protection and economic development. We cannot ignore 
that SSR impacts on State power relations and privileges. As mentioned on the 
Africa Briefing Report, (Observatoire de l’Afrique, 2008: 3) “…further difficulty 
arises from the sensitivity of the security sector. DDR and SSR both touch the key 
governing functions of the State that are very closely linked to its sovereignty”. 
Nevertheless, SSR is not a standalone process, in that it is absolutely fundamental 
to understand that together with the national driving force to reform the process 
must be perceived by regional partners as a remarkable contribution to conflict 
prevention and supported accordingly.
 
How to Reform?
“It is better to let them do it themselves imperfectly, than do it yourself perfectly.
It is their country, their way and our time is short”.
T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1926)
We reform by discovering the real security feelings of the people but also bear‑
ing in mind that “effective SSR enables a State to build its capacity to provide se‑
curity and justice” (Meharg, 2010: 8). It often seems that an SSR process is expected 
to be brought from the outside as a “magic entity” to fix all the nation’s evils. 
Consequently, SSR has a propensity to be seen as an external body, coming to the 
nation to pay all the bills and to solve all the problems, by superseding a status 
quo with another status quo. In reality, a successful SSR is expected to be designed, 
managed and implemented by local actors, rather than external actors (Nathan, 
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2007: 4). Furthermore, by local actors we do not understand the local government 
alone, but all relevant stakeholders, the individuals that will profit from the new 
security environment and the so‑called spoilers. SSR is a transformation process 
led by local people to fulfill the needs of common people. Otherwise it is likely to 
be unsuccessful or to fall short.
How to reform implies the establishment a system capable of improving the 
general well‑being, and at the same time it is intended to be held accountable. All 
in all, a successful SSR process has to deliver the following complementary fea‑
tures: good governance, effectiveness and accountability. 
• Good Governance – describes the process of decision‑making and the proc‑
ess by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented). The term 
governance can apply to corporate, international, national, local governance 
or to the interactions between other sectors of society (United Nations Social 
and Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific). According to the Unit‑
ed Nations good governance is consensus oriented, participatory, following 
the rule of law, effective and efficient, accountable, transparent, responsive, 
equitable and inclusive.
• Effectiveness – it refers to improving the provision of security and justice 
services in order to enhance the overall well‑being of the State and its people 
(DCAF/ISSAT, 2011: 9). In simple terms, to produce the intent or expected 
result. It includes qualified training, balanced provision of equipments, im‑
provement of management skills, development of new organization solu‑
tions and enhancing cooperation mechanisms.
• Accountability – envisages the adherence of security actors to domestic law 
and international binding law either through a distributive or a retributive 
justice.  It provides the necessary checks to ensure lawful behaviors and 
sanctions to unlawful actions. Accountability might be provided both for‑
mally (Internal and external) and informally. The importance of the ability to 
hold individuals accountable has been emphasized by Jean‑Marie Guéhen‑
no, former United Nations Under‑Secretary General for Peacekeeping Op‑
erations (2010) by the following quoting: “If one does not address issues 
of accountability and chains of command and how the security forces are 
located within the broader apparatus of the State, SSR is just training people 
to be more efficient at killing others.”3
The SSR needs to be holistic. The interconnected nature of the various compo‑
nents of the security and justice sector, together with the so called cross‑cutting 
3 Disponível em http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/govern‑
ance.asp
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issues, and the number and nature of the actors involved, calls for a holistic SSR 
approach. To be holistic doesn’t imply doing everything at the same time. On the 
contrary, it entails strategic level planning capable of identifying the key objec‑
tives, the core activities, and the right level of actors’ involvement and coordina‑
tion. It further requires a well‑built ability to delight donors in order to bring them 
to the comprehensiveness of the enterprise, without turning down their proposals, 
ideas and their huge potential to make a difference.
Why EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Stands as a Token?
“Security is survival-plus”.
Ken Booth (2007)
It does stand as a token because it had been strictly planned as such. In fact, 
under the initiative of the rotating Presidency of the European Union held by Por‑
tugal in the second half of 2007, the European Union Mission on Security Sector 
Reform in Guinea‑Bissau (EU SSR Guinea‑Bissau) was implemented in the first 
quarter of 2008, under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).   
This civil European Union Mission answered in this way to an official petition 
for support, formulated by the then President Nino Vieira whose objective was to 
support the Guinea‑Bissau authorities in the complex application process of the 
fundamental document Strategies for the Reform of Security Sector in Guinea-Bissau. 
This document had been drafted by one of the national teams, advised by British 
experts and, approved in the National Assembly, on 23 January 2008. In this docu‑
ment they competed, simultaneously, plans of action and the implementation of 
the sector strategies. Besides this objective, the mission also had the purpose of 
creating the necessary conditions for promoting assistance to third countries and 
international and regional organizations in terms of the ambitious projects in the 
security, defense and justice areas.   
The arrival of the first advanced team in Bissau on 14 April 2008 allowed the 
declaration of the mission’s Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on 8 June 2008, 
beginning like this a phase that would last for 12 months. This period was later 
extended for another 16 months. The mission was composed of 22 international 
members. Among them was administrative, advisory and 19 local hired staff. The 
reform’s landmark centered not only on the plans but also the legal framework 
prepared by Guinea’s Government in close coordination with the key institutions 
of Guinea‑Bissau. Moreover, it covered the following areas: armed forces, security 
forces, police, marine and border control.  
The mission establishment was considered an important political victory and 
an enormous support for the SSR process, strongly backed by Portugal, Spain and 
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France, with the assistance of the European Commission. Despite this initial lever‑
age, the most skeptical sectors drew the attention of the international community 
to the slowness and weakness of the results obtained, recognizing great difficulties 
in carrying out such a mission.  Nevertheless, unpredictability and harsh condi‑
tions are the two major characteristics of the political scene in Guinea‑Bissau and 
the EU SSR in Guinea‑Bissau has to learn how to find its ways within this frame‑
work. This scenario had been confirmed by the incidents that took place on 1 April 
2010, in which Admiral Zamora Induta was overthrown as Chief Head of Defense 
(CHOD) and was replaced by Admiral Bubo N’Chuto. Admiral Bubo N’Chuto self 
proclaimed himself the new Guinea’s CHOD, despite his having sought refuge in 
the facilities of the United Nations in Bissau since 28 December 2009. 
The new phase of the European Union’s Mission faced a certain degree of po‑
litical reservation when on 13 April 2010 the Head of Mission, General Juan Este‑
ban Verástegui, before the Political and Security Committee (PSC), accentuated the 
uncertainty of the situation and the future of the security sector reform mission, 
empowering the positions against the establishment of the mission. In spite of this 
the European Union approved an extension of the EU SSR Guinea‑Bissau Mission 
for four months, in a reduced format, in order to give time to the Guinea‑Bissau 
authorities to find a solution. 
By the end of June 2010, taking the International Community by surprise, Gen‑
eral Indjai was named the new Guinea’s CHOD replacing Admiral Zamora Induta. 
Shortly after that, mid‑August, the European Union closed down the Security Sec‑
tor Reform in Guinea‑Bissau. The closure of the mission was disseminated to the 
public in a short press release, in which the European Union referred to the politi‑
cal situation and praised the efforts and the achievements of the reforms, namely: 
the National Guard and Police legal bodies, and the review of the military and 
justice code of law. 
The Security Sector Reform should be perceived as a voluntary action, accepted 
by the State to be reformed, while aware of the huge implications on society as a 
whole. In fact SSR impacts on power distribution and personal privileges. Fur‑
thermore, SSR largely depends upon the restructuring plan process. Within this 
framework, the consent to the presence of external actors, namely non‑State organ‑
izations, international organizations, and States, enforces the principle of “local 
ownership”, especially because the relations between all of them at bilateral and 
multilateral level are defined or at least framed by the rules of the hosting State. 
Consequently, it is crucial to adapt the SSR processes to the hosting State, taking 
into account the political situation, the culture and the people, bearing in mind that 
SSR impacts on the State pillars and that the risk of collapse is real.
The abovementioned strategic document Strategies for the Reform of Security Sec-
tor in Guinea-Bissau organized the key bodies of the SSR process as follows:  
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• Leading Level – Inter‑ministerial Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, 
gathering all ministers with reform responsibilities; 
• Execution Level – Steering Committee, chaired by the Minister of Defense 
and composed of the representatives of the defense, safety, and justice sec‑
tors, former combatants, technicians, and other international community 
representatives. Among these representatives one should underline the 
presence of the EU SSR Guinea‑Bissau head of mission.  
• Technical Level – Technical Coordination Committee later designated the 
Steering Committee Secretariat, where all the sectors involved in the process 
are represented.  This level gathers local technicians, experts and consultants 
of European Union mission. It was planned that they would work in many 
different areas in a coordinated manner under the general guidance of the 
hosting authorities.
Within this framework, the EU SSR mission plan of operations included the 
following objectives:     
• To assist and to advise the local authorities in the setting up of conditions for 
implementing the SSR national strategy, including downsizing and reorga‑
nizing the armed forces and the police;    
• To support the creation of the legal framework to reform the State institu‑
tions;    
• Execute the project design as a pre‑condition of the potential donors’ in‑
volvement.
Chart 3 – Guinea‑Bissau Institutional Reform Framework
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In reality, the SSR was about to reorganize the new armed forces based on the 
total amount of 3340 military staff in order to achieve two major goals: on the one 
hand to reduce the costs through recruitment with 70% of the total strength, and on 
the other hand to demilitarize the capital of the country, where 90% of the military 
were stationed.
From the police sector point of view the objective was to gather 9 different po‑
lice bodies belonging to 5 different ministries, into only 3 forces: National Guard, 
Civilian Police and Criminal Investigation Services. The State intelligence services 
were left out of this process by the host nation.
In terms of the justice sector the European Union settled on a working program 
with the judiciary, managed by the European Commission, which would be fo‑
cused on the area of fiscal control of national borders and on the improvement of 
performance among the judiciary services. Both border control and judiciary serv‑
ices were under the authority of the Ministry of Justice. Thus, the justice reform 
in Guinea‑Bissau was seen as a pilot experience within the scope of the European 
Security and Defense Policy, by the use of a comprehensive approach to crises, us‑
ing different tools that would all contribute to the same ultimate goal. 
Additionally, the preparation and implementation of the EU SSR Guinea‑Bis‑
sau Mission is other important aspect to be underlined. Thus, the main features to 
be emphasized are as follows: 
• The fact‑finding pre‑deployment missions should gather information in or‑
der to draw rigorous knowledge of the situation. Furthermore, they should 
be provided with enough time to develop and adjust the concept of opera‑
tions to the reality of the country. This type of mission is crucial to assist the 
establishment of the objectives adapted to the level of ambition and to the 
mandate’s term;    
• It is of utmost importance to set up a public information dissemination plan 
and to implement it with high priority. The communication plan should ad‑
dress the pre‑deployment phase, the initial stage and the mission execution 
phase, carefully selecting the main massages to be released in each phase, 
bearing in mind the local social context.
• The establishment of the mission’s manpower in number and expertise re‑
quirements should be tailored to the goals and objectives of each phase. 
• The fact‑finding pre‑deployment missions should evaluate the synchronism 
between the host nation political calendar and the European Union insti‑
tutional and political constraints. Based on this study the pre‑deployment 
missions are in position to assess the impact on the total length of the future 
mission.
• The fact‑finding pre‑deployment missions should also assess the ability of 
the host nation to take the lead of the process in order to assess the implica‑
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tion of the SSR process on the principle of “local ownership”. This assess‑
ment allows the adaptation of the key goals in terms of the effectiveness and 
time‑frame of the future mission.
• An SSR process is structural and it needs to be implemented over a long pe‑
riod of time. It is, however, desirable to establish a link between short‑term 
actions in the context of a crisis management procedure. Nevertheless, this 
linkage should be perceived as a line of continuity, in the long‑term to avoid 
the “temporary syndrome” that will have an impact on the perceptions of 
the population. The same idea applies to the projects linked to the termina‑
tion of the mission.
• The fact‑finding pre‑deployment missions should also establish an exit strat‑
egy that doesn't commit the international organizations and contributing 
States for too long. This exit strategy should preserve the idea of full support 
of the SSR process by the international community. 
Finally, the EU SSR mission in Guinea‑Bissau showed again the importance 
of understanding that in the context of the Common Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP) the crisis management concept calls for a holistic approach over long pe‑
riods. Consequently, it is hard to image SSR successful processes associated with 
short term mandates. Learning form the EU SSR Mission, we see SSR as a political 
and strategic process, driven by the host nation, and in which the external presence 
should only reinforce the national capacities (not only State capacities, but also lo‑
cal and civil capacities) to implement the process of change. 
The European Union possesses the capacity to manage crises through a com‑
bined resource of instruments of a diplomatic, economic, and military nature, and 
support to development, according to the circumstances and guided by a common 
identified strategy. In this context, the European Union stands as a token holding 
a unique ability to use all the instruments of the so called “smart power” working 
with State and non‑State actors, and comprehensively supporting the elements of 
a State reform. For that reason, the European Union still possesses a remarkable 
capacity to support the SSR process in Guinea‑Bissau. 
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Does Portugal Share the Current SSR International Views?
“…Portugal has been actively participating and integrating in several activities.
Among these activities we should point out the relevance of SSR  and DDR processes, 
as measures of post conflict stabilization and  reconstruction”. 
Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 73/2009: 5606
The current political views, the existing legal framework, and cooperation in 
the field are the supporting grounds to mention Portugal as an SSR concept build‑
er. The political program of the XIX Constitutional Government of Portugal, in the 
area of foreign policy, development and national defense, has established the need 
“to pay special attention to the exercise of the United Nations mandate in Security 
Council, reinforcing the image of the country as a State committed to international 
peace and to international conflicts’ resolution”. This political document further 
mentions that the international importance of a State becomes more and more de‑
pendent on its capacity and, above all, on its ability to actively contribute to the 
maintenance of peace and international security, acting at multilateral level. This 
statement is based on the fact that Portugal understands security in a broad con‑
text and that because of this it is ready to act and share the burden of protecting 
common interests. 
Chart 4 – Portuguese SSR Legal Framework
Therefore, to support the idea of Portugal being an SSR concept builder, two 
references are to be taken into consideration. Firstly, the Resolução do Conselho de 
Ministros n.º 196/2005 that passed the “[A] Strategic Vision for Portuguese coop‑
eration”. This political vision envisages the adoption of a cooperation policy as one 
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of the key pillars of Portuguese foreign policy. Furthermore, it establishes a bal‑
anced linkage between principles, priorities, programs and projects and leverages 
its multi‑dimension of the institutional national contribution. It also emphasizes 
the goals of the Millennium Declaration reinforcing the idea of human security 
as the basis of all SSR processes. This political document also places the role of 
Portuguese cooperation in the context of a larger coalition of political willingness, 
represented by other States acting under similar goals. It clearly establishes the 
following guiding principles:
• To participate in internal stabilization processes aiming at State reconstruc‑
tion and consolidation;  
• To participate in the fields of the security sector, democracy, governance, rule 
of law, State building, and State management in order to support the host 
nation’s general development. 
Additionally, the document refers to the concept of police security reform as a 
contribution to border control, administration, maintenance of public order, and 
the fight against crime, especially through the following actions:
• By improving the relationship between law enforcement and security ser‑
vices at the level of the organization, working procedures, education and 
training;  
• By reinforcing the internal stability conditions providing support to the po‑
litical and security institutions’ autonomy, security environment, and con‑
solidation of essential values of democracy and rule of law.  
The Portuguese cooperation policy envisages two fundamental scales within 
the actions supporting human security: protection and autonomy.
• Protection – This scale aims to support the victims of a violent conflict 
through an integrated use of political, military, security, humanitarian, and 
development instruments. In this regard, special attention should be paid to 
relief of the internally displaced people and refugees, by supporting the ac‑
tion of international organizations. 
• Autonomy – This scale aims to establish the main conditions for self‑sus‑
tained State action, and includes the support of DDR processes, as well as 
the reinforcement of the mechanisms capable of improving human security 
within a context of a fragile State. This scale also includes support given to 
the police and armed forces.
Secondly, the Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 73/2009, which passed 
the “National Strategy on Security and Development”, established the regular 
mechanisms of political and operational coordination, good practices, information 
sharing, and relationship with Portugal’s international partners. The main idea of 
this document is to ensure multi‑state and multi‑area planning and action in the 
context of fragile States. The strategy guides SSR as a comprehensive instrument, 
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crucial for developing States, and sees it as a major contribution to security and 
stabilization. The document points out the important role of Portugal as a State 
contributor to the adoption of the European Union Council conclusions on security 
and development, which took place during the Portuguese Presidency of the Euro‑
pean Union (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 73/2009: 5603).
Moreover, Portugal sees the level and objectives of State external action in terms 
of security defense framed by the use of security instruments alongside political, 
economic and social mechanisms. Within this framework, the active role played by 
the Portuguese State is grounded on the context of different international organi‑
zations, as follows:
• United Nations (UN) – Actively contributes to empower the organization as 
source peace operations and stabilization legitimacy;  
• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – Dynamically contributes to 
the development of crisis management instruments to reinforce the ability 
of operating collectively and in the context of an increasing presence of State 
and non‑State actors.
• European Union (UE) – Within the Common Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP), framework “developing military and civil capacities to partici‑
pate in international crisis management, and based on a comprehensive 
approach, preparing the means to contribute to the maintenance of peace 
and international security (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros n.º 73/2009: 
5605)”, as well as the participation in SSR, and DDR4, aiming to successfully 
conduct conflict stabilization.  
• Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ‑ Portugal 
chaired the OSCE Presidency in 2002 and is strongly engaged in “building 
bridges” through permanent dialogue and an effective/comprehensive con‑
tribution to crisis management.
• Community of Portuguese‑speaking Countries (CPLP) – Portugal is deeply 
engaged in development support action, language development, education‑
al exchanges of experiences, and the exploitation of resources, the environ‑
ment, gender, medical technical cooperation, justice, defense, and security 
advisory services.
Finally, the Portuguese Ministerial Defense Directive 2010‑2013 (Despacho do 
Gabinete do Ministro da Defesa Nacional n.º 7769/2010), clearly points out co‑
operative security within the United Nations, European Union and NATO as an 
instrument of an enlarged concept of security. In fact, the cooperative security con‑
cept "integrates the traditional objectives of the State, sovereignty and defense of 
4 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.
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the national territory, into a preventive philosophy, together with a global vision 
of the evolution of international insecurity, aiming to prevent and to limit, today’s 
conflicts”.  
Portuguese National Defense is understood as embracing a military compo‑
nent and a non‑military component, in an enlarged plan of interaction of all the 
sectors of national life, through a political multifaceted dimension, including dip‑
lomatic, economic, financial, social and cultural dimension, besides the military 
instrument. Portugal holds a huge historical experience, particularly in Africa in 
terms of conflict management, assuming multilateralism and bilateral cooperation 
as strong multipliers of peace. 
All in all, a successful SSR should involve a collation of States in a balanced 
manner, led by the hosting nation during a reasonable period of time. Moreover, 
the reform of the security sector must be seen as the empowerment of the host na‑
tion’s institutions in the context of public service. Effectively, this empowerment 
only leads to success if it places the individual and its fundamental rights at the 
center of a joint action. These ideas are shared by the major Portuguese instru‑
ments of policy relating to external cooperation.
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